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Introduction and summary
Banks make money many different ways. Some banks
employ traditional banking strategies, attracting house-
hold deposits in exchange for interest payments and
transaction services and earning a profit by lending
those funds to business customers at higher interest
rates. Other banks employ nontraditional strategies,
such as credit card banks or mortgage banks that offer
few depositor services, sell off most of their loans
soon after making them, and earn profits from the fees
they charge for originating, securitizing, and servicing
these loans. In between these two extremes lies a
continuum of traditional and nontraditional approach-
es to banking—focusing on local markets or serving
customers nationwide; catering to household custom-
ers or business clients; using a brick-and-mortar de-
livery system or an internet delivery system; and so on.
This panoply of business strategies is a relatively
new development in the U.S. banking industry, made
possible by deregulation, advances in information tech-
nology, and new financial processes. To date, academ-
ic economists have performed very little systematic
analysis of the relative profitability, riskiness, or long-
run viability of these different banking business models.
Academic studies of bank performance tend to focus
on issues of regulatory concern (for example, capital
adequacy, bank insolvency) or investor concern (for
example, the reaction of bank stock prices to bank
mergers) rather than broader questions of competitive
strategy. Moreover, many so-called studies of banking
business strategies focus myopically on banking com-
pany size. Although banks of different sizes often do
different things in different ways, size is a poor proxy
for strategy: It assumes that the banking strategy space
has only one dimension; it assumes that a bank’s size
always constrains its choice of a business model; and
it assumes that two banks of the same size always use
the same strategy. As we demonstrate in this article,
none of these assumptions are accurate. Moreover,
failing to recognize this can result in a misleading
analysis of bank performance.
This is the second of two companion pieces on
“How do banks make money?” appearing in this issue
of Economic Perspectives. In the first article, we fo-
cus on the remarkable increase in noninterest income
at U.S. commercial banks during the past two decades,
the regulatory and technological catalysts for this his-
toric change, and how this newfound reliance on non-
interest income can affect bank performance. In this
article, we explain how deregulation and technologi-
cal change have encouraged U.S. commercial banks
to become less like each other in virtually all aspects
of their operations—including the generation of non-
interest income—and how the resulting divergence in
banking strategies has affected the financial performance
of these companies. We define a variety of banking
business strategies based on differences in product mix,
funding sources, geographic focus, production tech-
niques, and other dimensions, and examine the finan-
cial performance of established U.S. banking companies
that used these strategies from 1993 through 2003. While
we recognize that bank size can have implications for
strategic choice and financial performance, we do not
use bank size to define any of the strategy groups.
We draw a number of conclusions about “how
banks make money” and how this may matter for the
future of the banking industry. First, we find substan-
tial differences in profitability and risk across the
various banking strategy groups. Importantly, low
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strategy. High average return strategies like corporate
banking tend to generate high amounts of risk, while
low average return strategies like community banking
tend to generate less risk; thus, on a risk-adjusted basis,
both high-return and low-return strategies may be fi-
nancially viable. Second, we find that very small banks
operate at a financial disadvantage regardless of their
competitive strategy. This suggests that the number of
very small U.S. banking companies is likely to continue
to decline in the future. However, our analysis suggests
that the business strategies typically associated with
small banks are financially viable when practiced by
“larger-than-average small banks,” and we stress that
under some circumstances even very small banking
companies can succeed. Third, we find some evidence
that banking companies without discernable competi-
tive strategies tend to perform poorly, as do banks that
employ traditional banking strategies without embracing
efficient new production methods. Both of these find-
ings are consistent with fundamental precepts of
good strategic management.
Banks have become less alike
Prior to the 1990s, banking companies in the U.S.
were relatively (though not completely) homogeneous.
In contrast, today’s commercial banking companies
are substantially different from each other in terms
of size, geographic scope, organizational structure,
product mix, funding sources, service quality, and cus-
tomer focus. This strategic diversity is a byproduct of
two decades of deregulation and technological change—
dramatically disruptive changes in the structural
underpinnings of our financial system,
which we address in detail in the two sec-
tions that follow.
DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004)
argue that two generic banking strategies
have emerged from the fog of deregula-
tion and technological change. This is il-
lustrated in figure 1, which describes the
strategic aftermath of deregulation and
technological change using four parame-
ters: bank size, bank unit costs, product
differentiation, and information quality.
The vertical dimension in the map mea-
sures bank size, with large banks at the
bottom and small banks at the top. Large
size allows banks to achieve low unit costs
through scale economies. The horizontal
dimension measures the degree to which
banks differentiate their products and ser-
vices from those of their competitors. To
provide personalized financial services,
banks must have non-quantifiable, or “soft,” informa-
tion about their customers. In this framework, banks
select their business strategies by combining a high
or low level of unit costs with a high or low degree
of product differentiation. The positions of the circles
indicate the business strategies selected by banks and
the relative sizes of the circles indicate the relative
sizes of the banks.
The first of these two generic strategies, repre-
sented by the small bubbles in the upper right-hand
corner of the map, is a traditional banking strategy.
Small banks operating in local markets develop close
relationships with their customers, provide value to
depositors through person-to-person contact at branch
offices, and make “relationship loans” to information-
ally opaque borrowers (for example, small businesses)
that do not have direct access to financial markets.
Although these locally focused banks operate with
relatively high unit costs, they can potentially earn
high interest margins: They pay low interest rates to
a loyal base of core depositors and they charge high
interest rates to borrowers over which they have mar-
ket power due to information-based switching costs.
These banks earn fee income mainly through service
charges on their deposit accounts.
The second of these two generic strategies, rep-
resented by the large bubbles in the lower left-hand
corner of the map, is a nontraditional banking strategy.
Large banks take advantage of economies of scale in
the production, marketing, securitization, and servic-
ing of “transaction loans” like credit cards and home
mortgages. These banks operate with low unit costs,
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Source: DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004).
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but they tend to earn low interest margins
because the loans they produce are essen-
tially financial commodities that are sold
in highly competitive markets. Large
amounts of noninterest income (for exam-
ple, fees from loan origination, securitiza-
tion, and servicing) are essential for this
model to be profitable. Note that this ap-
proach to commercial banking became
possible only after geographic deregula-
tion allowed banks to achieve larger scale
and after new technologies (for example,
credit scoring models, asset securitiza-
tion) permitted banks and other financial
institutions to create transaction loans.
It is important to observe that the
highly stylized banking strategies por-
trayed in figure 1 are characterized not
just by differences in bank size, but more
fundamentally by differences in customer
preferences, information quality, pricing
structures, and production techniques. As
such, this analysis implies that there is a
rich diversity of potentially profitable business strate-
gies for serving retail and commercial banking cus-
tomers. More fundamentally, it implies that the
banking companies pursuing those strategies should
have grown less like each other than in the past.
Indeed, there is evidence that they have. Figures 2
and 3 illustrate two of the dimensions across which
U.S. banking companies have become less alike since
1986. (The data used to construct these figures are
described in the previous article. See table 2 of that
article and the associated text.)
Figure 2 shows that the intensity of noninterest
income at banking companies of different sizes—very
small (with inflation-adjusted assets less than $100
million), small ($100 million to $1 billion), mid-sized
($1 billion to $10 billion), and large (greater than $10
billion)—has systematically diverged over the past
two decades. Noninterest income has become more
important on average for banks of all four sizes; how-
ever, it has increased by only about 25 percent for the
smallest banking companies while more than doubling
for the largest banking companies. These trends are
consistent with the emergence of the strategic dichot-
omy depicted in figure 1.
Banks have also grown less alike in the way they
fund their loans and other investments. Figure 3 dis-
plays the distribution of transaction deposits to assets
for banking companies in 1986 and 2003.1 This distri-
bution has flattened out over time, but not symmetri-
cally. On the one hand, there has been a considerable
displacement to the left, indicating that transaction
deposits have become a less important funding source
for many banking companies. On the other hand, the
stable right-hand side of the distribution indicates
that transaction deposits have remained a core source
of funding for many other commercial banks. Again,
this is consistent with the strategic dichotomy illus-
trated in figure 1.
Although some of the growing dissimilarities
across banking companies are clearly associated with
growing differences in bank size, there are rich stra-
tegic differences across commercial banking compa-
nies that have little to do with size. As we show later
in this article, these strategic differences lead to sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the financial performance of
banking companies. But before we get to that analysis,
we need to review the fundamental changes to the
banking environment that allowed banking companies
to grow so dissimilar in the first place.
Deregulation and banking business
strategies
Over the past 25 years, U.S. commercial banking
has been transformed from a heavily regulated indus-
try, in which banks were prohibited from competing
with each other, to a largely deregulated industry, in
which commercial banks compete vigorously among
themselves, as well as with investment banks, securi-
ties firms, and insurance companies. This historic in-
dustry deregulation, in conjunction with dramatic
FIGURE 2
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advances in banking technology, laid the groundwork
for new business strategies at commercial banks.
Deregulation has transformed almost every facet
of the banking industry. It has been pro-competitive
by allowing banks to expand into neighboring cities
and states, to offer financial products and services that
had previously been reserved for non-bank financial
institutions, and to set deposit interest rates according
to market forces. Deregulation has been pro-efficien-
cy: It encouraged scale economies by allowing banks
to grow larger; cost and revenue synergies by allow-
ing banks to broaden their product lines; and opera-
tional efficiencies by exposing banks to increased
market competition. And deregulation has been pro-
technology by allowing banking companies to attain
the large size necessary to fully benefit from declin-
ing cost technologies such as credit scoring and asset
securitization, to launch mass-market advertising,
and to better reduce risk via diversification.
Kane (1996), Kroszner and Strahan (1997, 1999),
and others argue that it was the behavior of banking
companies themselves that brought deregulation.
Banks routinely circumvented regulatory constraints
on geographic and product market expansion in the
years prior to deregulation, and these commentators
argue that deregulation was the optimal government
response because the relative cost of maintaining the
restrictions to one interest group (for example, large
banking companies) had became less than the rela-
tive benefit of maintaining the restrictions to other
interest groups (for example, small local banks that
had been protected from competition).
Deregulation has been a continuous and ongoing
process since the mid-1970s. Spong (2000) and
DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004) offer in-depth
treatments of the evolution of banking and financial
regulations over the past quarter-century and the im-
pact of those changes on the structure, strategies, and
performance of commercial banks. We limit our dis-
cussion here to just three deregulatory acts that have
proven to be especially influential for the competitive
strategies of commercial banking companies.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 sought to equalize the
competitive positions of commercial banks and thrift
institutions. Among other things, the act expanded
FIGURE 3
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the lending powers of thrift institutions to better match
those of commercial banks; increased deposit insur-
ance coverage to $100,000 for all insured depository
institutions; authorized new products such as NOW
(negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts nationwide;
and required the Federal Reserve to price its financial
services (for example, check clearing) and make those
services, as well as the discount window, available for
all commercial banks and thrifts. But for commercial
banking strategies, the most fundamental and far-reach-
ing consequence of this act was the six-year phase out
of Regulation Q.
Since the 1930s, Regulation Q had limited the
interest rates that banks could pay their customers on
time and savings deposits. Whenever competition for
deposits increased—for example, if a new deposit-
taking institution entered the local market or if alter-
native investment vehicles became more attractive
than bank deposits—banks could not respond by pay-
ing higher rates to their depositors. Instead, banks
compensated depositors for below-market interest
rates by giving them a “bundle” of related services
(for example, check printing, safety deposit boxes,
travelers’ checks) free of charge. This situation was
extremely inefficient—banks could, at best, only re-
spond crudely to changes in deposit market conditions
and, in a world of bundled pricing, banks had little
incentive to develop innovative deposit services for
which they could charge customers.
Since the phase-out of Regulation Q, banks have
gradually reduced bundled pricing in favor of charging
explicit fees for individual retail deposit products and
adjusting deposit interest rates up and down to reflect
market conditions. Free to charge explicit fees for
depositor services, banks had greater incentives to
offer new deposit-related products such as money-mar-
ket mutual funds, online bill pay, and overdraft protec-
tion. Free to pay market rates for deposits, efficiently
run banks that could use deposits the most productive-
ly became able to bid those funds away from less ef-
ficient banks.
The Riegle–Neal Act of 1994 eliminated nearly
all barriers to the geographic expansion of banking
companies across state boundaries. This federal mea-
sure put the finishing touch on over 20 years of piece-
meal deregulation by the states, which began in the
mid-1970s with the removal of existing restrictions
on in-state branching in a handful of individual states
and culminated with a number of multi-state compacts
that allowed banking companies to own and operate
affiliates in other states. By sweeping away most fed-
eral restrictions and remaining state restrictions on
interstate banking and branching, the Riegle–Neal
Act gave banking companies the freedom to enter new
states either by purchasing existing banking franchis-
es or by opening new branches and allowed multi-
bank holding companies to consolidate their separate
banking affiliates into systems of branch offices.
These changes had their most visible impact on
the structure of the banking system. A wave of inter-
state mergers and acquisitions has created a handful
of nearly nationwide banking companies (for exam-
ple, Bank of America, Citibank, J. P. Morgan–Chase),
as well as a second tier of superregional banking
companies (for example, Wells Fargo, Fifth Third,
Wachovia), most of which exceed the size of the
largest pre-Riegle–Neal banking companies. This geo-
graphic expansion has, in turn, provided new oppor-
tunities for both large and small banking companies
to improve their operational efficiency. Duplicative
back office systems (such as payroll and accounting)
and organizational expenditures (separate boards of
directors, bank examinations, and so on) could be
eliminated by consolidating individual banks into net-
works of branches. Automated, information-intensive
applications like credit scoring and asset securitization
became more cost effective as business volume in-
creased. Entry by large, out-of-state banking companies
has increased competitive rivalry in local banking mar-
kets and created incentives for increased efficiency at
local banks (DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff, 1998).
But the economies made possible by increased
bank size can come at a cost, especially for large re-
tail banks. For example, automated credit card lend-
ing and online bill-paying are low-cost ways to produce
large volumes of traditional banking services, but
these processes have changed the nature of retail
banking from a high-touch, relationship-based service
to an arms-length, financial commodity business.
DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004) argue that this
change has had a profound influence on the business
strategies of large banking companies: Because com-
modities do not command high margins, large banking
companies may come to rely on marketing and the
creation of brand images to support prices (much like
other large consumer product companies). And al-
though geographic deregulation has put community
banks at a cost disadvantage relative to large banking
companies, the small size of community banks can
work to their strategic advantage by allowing them to
provide the personal service for which deposit custom-
ers are willing to pay higher prices (or accept lower
interest rates) and for which small business custom-
ers are willing to pay higher interest rates.
The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 expanded
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companies. Formally, Gramm–Leach–Bliley (GLB)
repealed sections 20 and 32 of the Glass–Steagall Act
of 1933, a Depression-era law that effectively pro-
hibited commercial banks from engaging in investment
banking activities. In practice, GLB allows well-run
commercial bank holding companies to engage in se-
curities underwriting, securities brokerage, mutual
fund services, financial advisement, and related activi-
ties without limitation, so long as these activities are
conducted in a separate affiliate of the holding com-
pany. For well-run banks with federal charters, GLB
permits separately capitalized financial subsidiaries.
Similar to the Riegle–Neal Act, GLB was preced-
ed by a series of regulatory rulings during the 1990s
that incrementally relaxed restrictions on banking
powers. For example, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency granted national banks to power to
sell insurance from offices in small towns, and the
Federal Reserve partially relaxed the limitations on
the amount of revenue a banking company could gen-
erate in its Section 20 securities subsidiaries. But the
new product powers granted by GLB made a bigger
difference by completely relaxing the restrictions on
the permissible volumes of nonbanking activities and
by allowing commercial banks to engage in complete-
ly new activities such as merchant banking.
Some commercial banks now provide “one-stop-
shopping” for the typical retail customer, including
mortgage loans, credit cards, checking accounts, in-
vestment products and advice, and insurance products.
Similarly, some commercial banks now offer a full
range of financing options to their corporate custom-
ers, including loans, debt underwriting, and stock un-
derwriting. In either case, GLB allows commercial
banks to expand their traditional banking business
into less traditional financial service areas by lever-
aging their existing distribution networks as well as
the proprietary information they have gleaned over
the years about their retail and corporate customers.
Technological innovation and banking
business strategies
Financial services is among the industries that
have been most transformed by technological change.
Advances in information flows, communications in-
frastructure, and financial markets have dramatically
altered the way in which banks assess the creditworthi-
ness of their loan customers, service their deposit cus-
tomers, process payments, and produce and distribute
nearly all of their other products and services. Coupled
with the effects of industry deregulation, technologi-
cal advances have led to substantially increased com-
petition in the financial marketplace as both banks
and their nonbank rivals have become continuous in-
novators, forever attempting to improve and expand
the number and variety of financial products and ser-
vices that they offer.
To be sure, technological change would have oc-
curred in the banking industry even in the absence of
deregulation. But deregulation sped the application
of new technologies by allowing banks to achieve the
scale necessary to use new technologies efficiently and,
by enhancing competition, deregulation provided banks
with incentives to adopt and adapt these new technolo-
gies. As discussed above, this process also worked in
the opposite direction, with technological advance
speeding the progress of deregulation. As new technolo-
gies increased the efficiency of large-scale banking
and created synergies between traditional and nontra-
ditional banking products, the industry and its advo-
cates were able to bring pressure to break down the
barriers to geographic expansion. This included bold
circumvention of existing legal constraints on geographic
and product market expansion, the most famous of
which was the 1998 merger of banking giant Citibank
with insurance giant Travelers, more than a year before
the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999.
Technological changes in the banking industry can
be roughly separated into two categories: improvements
in data processing and communications technologies and
the emergence of entirely new financial instruments,
markets, and production processes. The former has
allowed financial information to flow more quickly,
accurately, and cheaply; the latter largely reflects the
manner in which banking companies and their competi-
tors have exploited these new information flows. To-
gether, these phenomena have played key roles in the
evolution of bank business strategies and the ways that
banks make money. We offer three examples here.
Payment services
Faster information flows have transformed the
manner in which banks provide payment services to
their customers. The development and expansion of
electronic payment channels and instruments have
permitted banks to offer their deposit customers un-
precedented levels of convenience, often at lower
costs. For example, today about 34 percent of house-
hold payments are made using electronic channels
like debit cards, credit cards, and automated bill pay;
as recently as 1990 only about 15 percent of house-
hold transactions were electronic, with the remaining
85 percent made with cash and checks (HSN Consult-
ants, Inc., 2002).
The reduction in use of the physical paycheck is
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through the Automated Clearing House (ACH). ACH
not only makes direct deposit of household wages
possible, but it facilitates automated online bill pay
for households and businesses, in addition to other
recurring transactions. Retail business customers
benefit from electronic lockbox services and check
truncation, and the recently passed Check 21 legisla-
tion will accelerate these changes in our financial in-
frastructure by requiring banks to accept “substitute
checks,” which can be transmitted as electronic images.
And for those who wish to make old-fashioned cash
transactions, financial information that flows through
ATM (automated teller machine) networks has made
access to cash more convenient, while generating fee
income for banks and creating an entirely new finan-
cial service sector for nonbank owners of ATMs.
Online brokerage
A more specialized application of financial infor-
mation technology is online discount brokerage. On-
line brokerage of any sort was obviously not possible
prior to the invention of the internet, and the discount
brokerage model fits well with this distribution channel.
This application reduces production costs two differ-
ent ways: potential scale economies from operating
on a nationwide basis and potential reductions in over-
head expenses by targeting “do-it-yourself” customers.
(For these customers, less personal service ironically
translates into greater convenience.) Because this prod-
uct is offered in a very competitive marketplace, on-
line discount brokerage firms like Charles Schwab and
E*Trade must pass a large portion of these savings on
to their customers in the form of lower transaction fees.
Along with other changes in the retail financial
landscape—like the widespread adoption of mutual
fund investing and the shift to defined contribution
pension plans—the emergence of discount brokerage
firms has increased the competition for household
savings and investments. In response, most large re-
tail banks now offer some version of online brokerage
to help retain retail depositors.
Intermediation
Banks have traditionally earned most of their prof-
its by intermediating between parties that have excess
liquidity (depositors) and parties that need additional
liquidity (borrowers). For a variety of reasons, banks
historically have been better than other institutions at
mitigating the informational asymmetries and other lo-
gistical problems that prevent direct finance between these
parties.2 But advances in information processing and
financial markets have greatly reduced banks’ compara-
tive advantages, and the resulting “disintermediation”
has changed, in some cases dramatically, the roles
that banks play in credit markets.
On the consumer lending side, the advent of credit
scoring models that use “hard” (that is, quantifiable)
information to evaluate creditworthiness, together
with the development of secondary markets for secu-
ritized loans, has changed the way that banks and
other financial institutions provide credit to households
(Stein, 2002). Instead of earning interest margins from
holding mortgage, auto, or credit card loans in their
loan portfolios, banks can earn separate fees for orig-
inating the loans, securitizing the loans, and servic-
ing the loans, while the interest income flows to the
investors that purchase the securities backed by these
loans. New financial institutions—such as brokers
that originate and immediately securitize home mort-
gages and monoline credit card and finance companies
that take advantage of huge scale economies in the
production, distribution, and servicing of consumer
credit—have emerged to service much of the market
share in consumer credit that traditionally belonged
to depository institutions like banks.
On the business lending side, the introduction of
high-yield (“junk”) bonds, increased access to com-
mercial paper, and other financial market developments
have allowed large commercial borrowers to bypass
banks in favor of direct finance. While commercial
banks have lost considerable market share in com-
mercial lending, one way that they continue to play a
role in commercial finance is by charging a fee in ex-
change for providing the back-up lines of credit that
firms need to float commercial paper. In this new tech-
nological environment, loans to small and moderate-
sized businesses based on private, information-rich
relationships between business people and their com-
mercial bankers stand out as one of the last types of
loans that are still produced in the traditional inter-
mediation fashion.
Business strategies at banking companies
A simple and often-employed method for com-
paring the performance of different banking strategies
is to separate banking companies by size. As we have
seen, scale is clearly important: The scale of a large
banking company gives it access to low-unit-cost mar-
keting and production techniques, while the scale of
a small banking company allows it to build person-
to-person relationships with its customers. But econ-
omies of scale is not the only dimension across which
banking companies vary strategically. Moreover, we
assume that achieving a large scale, a medium scale,
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company; rather, it is to earn a rate of return commen-
surate with the risk to which owners of the bank are
exposed. In pursuit of high risk-adjusted earnings,
banking companies choose from among many bank-
ing strategies, some of which can be practiced by
small banks as well as large banks.
For the purposes of this study, we define eight
distinct banking business strategies based on differ-
ences in product mix, location, production techniques,
and other characteristics across U.S. banking compa-
nies: traditional banking, nontraditional banking, pri-
vate banking, agricultural banking, corporate banking,
local community focus, payment transactions, and a
diversified banking strategy. The procedures we use
to define these strategy groups, and to assign banking
companies to these groups, are presented below and
are not highly scientific. We used our informed judg-
ment to select a short list of characteristics that one
would expect to find at banks that used each of these
business strategies and we set arbitrary numerical
thresholds for each of those characteristics above or
below which banking companies would be included
in, or excluded from, each strategy group. It is impor-
tant to note that we did not use bank size to define any
of these eight strategy groups and, as a result, each
strategy group includes banking companies of differ-
ent sizes. (For comparative purposes, we also define
a number of groups based purely on bank size and
bank growth rates.)
Banking companies were eligible for assignment
to one or more of these strategy groups if they were
at least ten years old in 1993,3 were still operating in
2003, were domestically owned, and had positive
amounts of loans, transaction deposits, deposits in-
sured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and equity capital in both 1993 and 2003.
A total of 1,281 banking companies met these eligi-
bility conditions. We selected the 1993–2003 period
because it began after the passage of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) of 1991 and because it was long enough
to adequately observe the variability of banking com-
pany returns over an entire business cycle. We drew
the data for our analysis chiefly from the Reports of
Condition and Income (call reports), Federal Reserve
Board FR Y-9C reports, the Federal Reserve Board
National Information Center’s (NIC) structure data-
base, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
Summary of Deposits database, and the Center for
Research on Stock Prices (CRSP) database. We ex-
press all data in thousands of year 2003 dollars, un-
less otherwise indicated.
The eight business strategies are not meant to be
fully exhaustive of all the competitive strategies being
used by banking companies today. Moreover, we de-
fined the strategy groups tightly: Over half (758 out
of 1,281) of the eligible banking companies were not
assigned to any strategy group. Although we did not
design the strategy groups to be mutually exclusive,
only about 10 percent (123) of the 1,281 banking com-
panies fell into more than a single group; of these,
just 28 banking companies were assigned to three or
more strategy groups, and just two banking compa-
nies were assigned to four strategy groups.
The traditional banking group contains 117 bank-
ing companies; 2003 assets averaged about $242 mil-
lion and ranged from $10 million to $1.7 billion. To
be included in this strategy group, banking companies
had to be portfolio lenders that did not securitize any
assets in either 1993 or 2003, and their ratios of core
deposits to assets, loans to assets, and net interest in-
come to operating income all had to rank higher than
the 25th percentile among our sample of 1,281 bank-
ing companies in both 1993 and 2003.
The nontraditional banking group contains 29
banking companies; 2003 assets averaged about $140
billion and ranged from $590 million to $771 billion.
To be included in this strategy group, banking com-
panies had to securitize at least some assets in both
1993 and 2003; rank lower than the 25th percentile
in our sample in terms of both deposits to assets and
net interest income to operating income; and rank
above the 75th percentile in terms of the asset value
of letters of credit issued to assets. This group includes
many of the nationally recognized commercial bank-
ing companies (for example, Bank of America, J. P.
Morgan–Chase, Wachovia, Wells Fargo), as well as a
number of superregional (for example, Fifth Third,
National City, Suntrust) and regional commercial
banks (for example, First Tennessee, Marshall &
Ilsley, Regions Financial).
The private banking group contains 11 banking
companies; 2003 assets averaged about $25 billion
and ranged from $550 million to $92 billion. To be
included in this strategy group, banking companies
had to rank above the 99th percentile in terms of fi-
duciary income to operating income in 1993 and 2003.
Some of the better known companies in this group
are Northern Trust, State Street, Bank of New York,
and Mellon Financial.
The agricultural banking group contains 96 bank-
ing companies; 2003 assets averaged $108 million and
ranged from $4 million to $1.2 billion. To be included
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above the top 90th percentile in terms of agricultural
production loans to total loans in both 1993 and 2003.
The corporate banking group contains 14 banking
companies; 2003 assets averaged about $74 billion
and ranged from $729 million to $327 billion. To be
included in this strategy group, investment banking
activities had to generate at least 1 percent of a bank’s
operating income in 2003; the bank had to rank above
the 75th percentile in commercial loans to total loans
in both 1993 and 2003; and the bank had to rank above
the 50th percentile of the sample in terms of demand
deposits to total deposits and the asset value of letters
of credit issued to assets in both 1993 and 2003. Some
of the companies included in this group are Bank One
(before its acquisition by J. P. Morgan–Chase), Com-
merce Bancshares, FleetBoston (before its acquisi-
tion by Bank of America), Huntington Bancshares,
Mellon Financial, PNC Financial, and U.S. Bancorp.
The community focus group contains 151 banking
companies; 2003 assets averaged about $268 million
and ranged from $8 million to $4.1 billion. Companies
in this strategy group generated at least half of their
deposits from a one-county area and ranked above the
50th percentile in core deposits to assets and loans to
assets, in both 1993 and 2003.
The transaction services group contains 96 banking
companies; 2003 assets averaged about $1.6 billion
and ranged from $8 million to $46 billion. Banking
companies in this strategy group ranked above the
top 75 percent of banking companies in terms of both
payment-related income associated largely with checking
transactions (service charges on deposits plus foregone
interest revenue on deposits) and payment-related in-
come not necessarily associated with checking trans-
actions (estimated payment-related fees from ATM,
fiduciary, and credit card activities) as a percentage
of operating income in 2003.
The diversified banking group contains 97 banking
companies; 2003 assets averaged about $1.6 billion
and ranged from $160 million to $26 billion. This
strategy group includes banking companies that do
not specialize in any of the areas described above but
participate to at least some extent in each of those areas.
To be included in this strategy group, banks had to
rank between the 10th and 90th percentiles among the
1,281 eligible banks in terms of service charges to
assets, other (non-service charge) noninterest income
to assets, net interest income to assets, home mortgage
loans to total loans, commercial real estate loans to
total loans, and consumer loans to total loans in both
1993 and 2003. Moreover, these banks had to rank
above the 90th percentile in terms of commercial loans
to total loans and below the 90th percentile in agri-
cultural production loans to total loans, in both years.
In addition to these eight largely activities-based
strategy groups, we defined five purely size-based strate-
gy groups: assets less than $100 million (541 banks);
assets between $100 million and $500 million (303
banks); assets between $500 million and $1 billion
(59 banks); assets between $1 billion and $10 billion
(89 banks); and assets greater than $10 billion (29
banks). We applied these size thresholds to the assets
of each banking company twice: In 2003 we applied
them to actual 2003 asset values, and in 1993 we ap-
plied them to 1993 asset values that had been adjust-
ed upward to account for industry asset growth and
inflation between 1993 and 2003. We also defined
two strategy groups based on the asset growth rates.
The geographic deregulation of U.S. banking markets
in the late 1980s and 1990s created unparalleled op-
portunities for U.S. banking companies to grow, ei-
ther by making acquisitions or by growing internally.
The mergers (external growth) group contains 17
banking companies, with 2003 assets averaging $143
billion in a range from $514 million to $771 billion.
These banking companies grew at an inflation-adjusted
rate of 250 percent or more between 1993 and 2003,
and at least 25 percent of this increased size was at-
tributable to assets acquired in mergers. The growers
(internal growth) group contains 85 banking compa-
nies, with 2003 assets averaging $2.8 billion and
ranging from $47 million to $88 billion. These bank-
ing companies grew at an inflation-adjusted rate of
250 percent or more between 1993 and 2003 without
making any major acquisitions.
Finally, we defined a no-strategy group. This
group contains 113 banking companies that did not
qualify for any of the eight main strategy groups in
both 1993 and 2003. (Note that the no-strategy group
does not include banking companies that “switched”
strategies, that is, banks that qualified for one of the
eight main strategy groups in 1993 and qualified for
a different strategy group in 2003. The financial per-
formance of these banks would likely have been im-
pacted by the costs of transitioning from one
business strategy to another.)
Financial performance of different
business strategies
We used quarterly accounting data to calculate
three financial performance measures for each of the
1,281 banking companies in our 1993–2003 dataset:
The profitability of each bank is the annualized aver-
age return on equity (ROE) over the 44 quarters from
1993 through 2003. The riskiness of each bank is the61 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
annualized standard deviation of quarterly ROE over
that period. The risk-adjusted return of each bank, also
known as the Sharpe ratio, is the annualized quarter-
ly ROE minus the annualized interest rate on 90-day
Treasury bills, divided by the annualized standard
deviation of quarterly ROE.4 In addition, for the 157
banking companies in our dataset that were publicly
traded, we used weekly stock prices to calculate mar-
ket-based analogs of these three financial performance
measures.
Table 1 displays summary statistics (means and
standard deviations) for all of our performance mea-
sures. We note that our performance measures are
observed ex post—that is, they reflect actual rather
than expected revenues and expenses—and as such
they are just proxies for investors’ expectations of fu-
ture returns, upon which finance theory is based. We
also note that our dataset excludes banking compa-
nies that were acquired or failed between 1993 and
2003, and as a result the performance measures for
the “surviving” companies that populate our dataset
may be biased. For example, banks that practice es-
pecially risky strategies will be more likely to fail, all
else being equal, so the average ROE for a high-risk
strategy group may be biased upward.
The quarterly accounting-based returns exhibit
considerably less variation over time—and as a re-
sult, substantially higher risk-adjusted profits—than
the weekly stock market returns. This difference is
likely due to three factors: accounting conventions
that affect the valuation of assets and the way that
expenditures are recognized over time; changes in
relevant information and investor expectations that
are priced by the stock market but not included in
backward-looking accounting statements; and the
different frequencies over which we observe the ac-
counting data and the market data (quarters versus
weeks).5  Also note that the accounting-based returns
are substantially lower on average than the stock
market-based returns. The most likely explanation is
that publicly traded companies with low returns are
likely to become takeover targets and drop out of our
sample, while closely held private companies (often
small banks) with low returns are more likely to con-
tinue to operate independently.
Accounting-based financial performance
Figure 4 plots the average accounting-based re-
turn and risk measures for each of the strategy groups.
These average risk-return profiles fall into two clus-
ters. One cluster of strategies (diversified, corporate,
nontraditional, private banking, mergers, and growers)
forms an arc of risk–return combinations consistent
with the fundamental principle of finance that markets
reward risk-taking with higher returns, but that the
returns to risk-taking are diminishing. (This arc is not
a representation of the “efficient” risk-return frontier,
because we have plotted it based on the average risks
and average returns of the banks in each strategy
group.)6 Moving from left to right on the graph—from
low-risk–low-return strategies to higher-risk–higher-
return strategies—these strategy groups line up in an
economically sensible order. Not surprisingly, the di-
versified strategy has the lowest (ex post) risk position.
The corporate, nontraditional, and private banking
groups come next, with increasingly higher levels of
risk (and associated higher returns) that are roughly
consistent with the increasing reliance of the banks
in these groups on noninterest income (DeYoung and
Roland, 2001).
The highest risks and the highest returns, on aver-
age, are generated by banking companies that grew
quickly during the sample period by either external
means (the mergers group) or internal means (the
growers group). For the merging banks, accounting
earnings are likely to be volatile because of accounting
charges taken during the post-merger transition peri-
od. For the growing banks, this volatility is likely re-
lated to several different phenomena: the temporary
excess capacity in physical plant necessary to grow a
bank by opening new branch locations; a slippage in
credit quality that often occurs when banks attempt
to grow their loan portfolios quickly; and the purchase
of expensive time deposit funding to which these banks
often must resort to finance fast asset growth. The
high accounting earnings also have a number of
plausible explanations. On the one hand, profitable
Quarterly Weekly stock
accounting ROE market returns







   return (3.5873) (0.2094)
Notes: ROE is return on equity. Performance measures are observed
ex post. Banking companies that were acquired or failed are not
included. Measures are not comparable across columns.
TABLE 1
Accounting-based and market-based financial
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banks are better able to generate the large amounts of
internal funds to make the repeated purchases or in-
vestments necessary to expand rapidly. On the other
hand, the data simply may indicate that merger-based
and growth-based strategies tended to pay off during
the 1990s (Calomiris and Karceski, 1998). Finally,
the returns for the high-risk growers strategy may be
biased upward to the extent that unsuccessful fast-
growing banks that failed are not in our dataset.
A second cluster of strategies (traditional, com-
munity focus, transactions, agricultural, and no strat-
egy) lies well below the risk-return arc. The returns
generated by the banks using these strategies do not
appear to be high enough to compensate bank own-
ers for the risks they are taking—in other words, the
data suggest that these are not economically viable
banking strategies, and these strategies and the bank-
ing companies that use them could disappear from
the banking industry sometime in the future. But be-
fore writing off these banking strategies, we note that
there is a substantial size disparity between the two
clusters of banking companies: Those on the risk–re-
turn arc tend to contain larger banks, while those in
the lower cluster tend to contain small banks. Is the
poor average financial performance of the banks in
the second cluster of strategy groups attributable to
untenable banking strategies, inefficiently small bank
size, or a combination of both?
To investigate this possibility, we plotted the aver-
age accounting-based return and risk measures for each
of our five purely sized-based groups. As
shown in figure 5, for banking companies
with assets less than $500 million in-
creased size unambiguously improves (ex
post) financial performance—that is, re-
turns increase without having to accept
more risk—while for banking companies
larger than $500 million increased returns
are attainable on average only by accept-
ing increased risk. This crude analysis is
consistent with several findings in the
bank scale economy literature. In general,
this literature finds that even relatively
large banking companies can expect to re-
duce per-unit costs by growing larger.
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) pro-
vide a relatively recent review of this lit-
erature. However, Evanoff and Israilevich
(1991) and Berger and Humphrey (1991)
demonstrated that the bulk of these per-
unit cost improvements are captured at
relatively small bank size—that is, aver-
age costs decrease with bank size but at a
rapidly diminishing rate. Other studies have found
that banking companies that grow larger tend to take
on increased risk (for example, Demsetz and Strahan,
1997; Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 1996), con-
sistent with the patterns for the larger banking com-
panies in figure 5.
Although this demonstration of the risk–return
effects of increased banking company scale is admit-
tedly crude, applying these findings to our analysis
produces stark and economically sensible results. In
figure 6 we re-plot the average risk profiles of the
banking strategy groups after removing companies
with assets less than $500 million. The result is a rel-
atively smooth arrangement of the strategy groups
along the original risk–return arc from figure 4. (The
average risk–return tradeoff between these strategy
groups is illustrated by a quadratic ordinary least
squares trend line estimated for the 11 data points
shown in the figure. Again, we note that this line is
based on average financial performance, and is not an
“efficient risk–return” frontier.) The community focus,
agricultural, and transactions strategy groups are now
located on the imaginary risk–return arc and exhibit
the relatively low levels of risk that are consistent
with business models that rely on close customer re-
lationships.
Although the risk–return profiles of the traditional
and no-strategy groups also improved after adjusting
for scale effects, these two groups still fall somewhat
short of the other strategy groups. For the no-strategy
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group, the explanation may be that firms that lack stra-
tegic direction will naturally perform poorly (Porter,
1980). For the traditional group, the explanation may
be that recent advances in information flows, pricing
strategies, and production methods can enhance prof-
itability, and banking companies that do not integrate
these advances into their business model will operate
at a disadvantage.
Transforming risk into return
Figure 6 provides reasonably compelling evi-
dence that changing strategies would require a bank-
ing company to accept more risk in exchange for
higher returns or lower returns in exchange for lower
risk, on average. However, the figure does not reveal
directly whether any of these risk–return tradeoffs
are superior to others. In table 2 we rank each of the
strategy groups shown in figure 6 by their average risk-
adjusted returns, or Sharpe ratios. The Sharpe ratio
can be interpreted as a measure of how well a banking
company transforms risk-taking into profitability.7
This average performance measure divides the
strategies into three subgroups. The growers have by
far the worst Sharpe ratios, equal to just 5.3 on aver-
age. Despite the possible upward performance bias
for this group (discussed above), banking companies
that experienced rapid internal growth tended to gen-
erate low returns relative to the riskiness of this behav-
ior. A second subgroup includes the traditional, private,
agricultural, and no-strategy banks, with Sharpe
FIGURE 5













risk (standard deviation of ROE)
return (ROE)
ratios ranging from 6.0 to 6.7 on average.
We discussed the potential shortcomings
of the traditional strategy and the no-strat-
egy groups above. The relatively poor
performance of the private banking strate-
gy group is likely explained by the large
fluctuations in the stock market during the
latter half of our sample period, while the
small number (five) of agricultural banks
in this analysis makes the poor average
performance of this group difficult to in-
terpret. The third subgroup includes the
community, corporate, mergers, diversi-
fied, transactions, and nontraditional strat-
egy groups, with Sharpe ratios ranging
from 7.3 percent to 8.1 on average. The
relatively good risk–return performance
of these six strategies is instructive: These
strategy groups are very different in terms
of product mix, customer focus, produc-
tion processes, funding sources, and com-
pany size. Thus, the data in table 2
suggest that a broad range of different
types of banking strategies are financially
viable, once banking companies have achieved at
least a modicum of scale.
We performed a complete set of pair-wise tests
to see which pairs of strategy groups had statistically
different average Sharpe ratios and found only a few
of the pairs to be statistically different. One way to
interpret this result is that all of these strategic
groups can be, on average, economically viable.
However, it is more likely that the small number of
observations in some of the strategy groups, along
Number Mean
Rank Strategy of firms Sharpe ratio
1 Nontraditional 29 8.0621
2 Transactions 24 7.9124
3 Diversified 60 7.7869
4 Mergers 17 7.4915
5 Corporate 14 7.4682
6 Community 26 7.2875
7 No strategy 113 6.6622
8 Agricultural 5 6.4347
9 Private 11 6.3675
10 Traditional 17 6.0248
11 Growers 50 5.2830
Note: Calculations exclude banking companies with assets
greater than $500 million.
TABLE 2
Strategy groups by average accounting-based
Sharpe ratios64 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
with substantial noise in our estimated Sharpe ratios,
is simply preventing us from finding statistical differ-
ences between most of the strategy pairs.
Market-based financial performance
We re-plotted the risk–return averages
once again, this time using stock market-
based performance measures. Although
we have stock market returns for only
about 12 percent of the 1,281 banking
companies in our sample, using these
data to compare the risk–return profiles
of the strategy groups provides a good
robustness check on our accounting-based
risk–return analysis. Stock returns reflect
more information than accounting returns,
and the stock prices upon which they are
based are forward-looking valuations by
informed investors rather than backward-
looking records based on often arcane ac-
counting rules.
Figure 7 displays the average market-
based return and risk measures for the
strategy groups that contained at least five
publicly traded banking companies with
assets greater than $500 million. The re-
sults are quite consistent with the account-
ing-based plots. The diversified strategy
group once again defines the low-risk,
low-return endpoint, and the growers
group once again defines the high-risk,
high-return endpoint. In between these
two endpoints, six other strategies—
transactions, corporate, nontraditional,
private, mergers, and no-strategy—are
arrayed in a risk–return ordering some-
what similar to the accounting-based or-
dering plotted in figure 6. Thus, we have
some confidence that our accounting-
based risk and return measures are pro-
viding a roughly accurate ordering
of the relative risks and returns across
banking strategies.
Finally, to demonstrate the large
amount of variability in these data, we
plotted the market-based performance
measures for the individual banking
companies from three strategy groups
with distinctively different risk–return
profiles: the diversified strategy, the non-
traditional strategy, and the grower strat-
egy. Figure 8 shows the resulting scatter
plot. Although the individual data points
overlap to a large extent, they do not overlap com-
pletely, and it is easy to see a rough, but positive, risk–
FIGURE 6















risk (standard deviation of ROE)
return (mean ROE)
FIGURE 7
Average stock market returns and risk for strategy groups
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expected return tradeoff across these three strategies.
The scatter plot also provides a good illustration of
why it can be difficult to find statistical differences in
risk-adjusted returns across strategic groups, even
though the banking companies in these groups show
a systematic risk–return ordering.
Conclusions and implications
We began this set of articles by asking the ques-
tion “How do banks make money?” In the course of
our analysis we have discussed various trends and
developments in the banking industry that provide
partial answers to this question. But we have also un-
covered some broad themes regarding bank performance
and competitive strategies that make some banks
more profitable than others.
U.S. banking companies employ a wide variety
of business models. For example, some are special-
ized and some are very broad; some have a retail fo-
cus and some have a wholesale focus; some are
nationwide in scope and some are purely local; some
focus on traditional commercial banking and some
FIGURE 8
Stock market returns and risk for traded banking
companies with assets > $500 million in three selected
strategy groups
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growers diversified nontraditional
focus on non-bank financial services. We
find substantial differences in profitability
across these different strategic approach-
es—but we also find that high-return
strategies tend to generate high amounts
of risk, while relatively low-return strate-
gies tend to generate less risk. This sug-
gests a tradeoff between risk and return
that can leave the shareholders of high-
risk banks and the shareholders of low-
risk banks roughly equally compensated
on a risk-adjusted basis. In other words,
 a variety of different banking strategies—
from small, locally focused community
banking to large, economy-wide corporate
banking—appear to be financially viable
business models.
The major caveat to this conclusion is
that very small banks tend to operate at a
financial disadvantage, regardless of their
business model. In order to earn a market
return for their shareholders, banking
companies must capture at least some of
the scale economies that are available in
banking production functions. Although we use an
asset size threshold of $500 million to make this
point in our analysis, we stress that the critical size
for a banking company varies with its strategy, and
even within a strategy group the critical size needed
for financial viability likely varies with managerial
abilities, local market conditions, and other consider-
ations. Our analysis suggests that the number of very
small U.S. banking companies is likely to continue to
decline in the future. Still, there are reasons to expect
that hundreds of very small banking companies will
continue to exist. For example, very small banks that
serve geographically isolated rural communities may
remain financially viable if the lack of competition in
these markets allows them to charge prices high
enough to offset the cost disadvantages associated with
very low scale. And, of course, very small banks whose
owners are willing to operate at a relatively low rate
of return in exchange for receiving personal satisfac-
tion or providing a community service are also likely
to survive in some numbers.66 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
1To check whether the shift in the distribution in figure 3 was
merely due to an increase in equity capital in most banks during
this period, we also examined the distribution of transaction depos-
its to liabilities. This distribution was nearly identical to figure 3.
2The function of banks as intermediaries lies at the core of a rich
theoretical literature on why banks exist. See DeYoung and Rice
(2004) for a short review of this literature.
3For bank holding companies (BHCs) and financial holding com-
panies (FHCs), we based this threshold on the average age of the
commercial banking affiliates in these multi-bank companies.
4The quarterly ROE data were de-seasonalized prior to these cal-
culations, and quarters in which banking companies made large
acquisitions were excluded from the calculations.
5To explore the extent to which the scale of the accounting-based
and market-based risk and return measures differ, we recalculated
the market-based measures using quarterly data. The average
market-based returns fell from 0.1726 to 0.1553 and the average
standard deviation of market-based returns fell from 0.2813 to
0.2579. These changes only partially closed the gap between the
accounting-based and market-based measures reported in table 1.
Thus, we conclude that the primary difference between the scales
of the market-based and accounting-based measures lies with ac-
counting conventions and not the frequency with which we ob-
serve the returns.
6We acknowledge that the average performance of banking com-
panies that use a given strategy may not be a good comparative
indicator of the potential performance of that strategy. For ex-
ample, it may be the case that some strategies are attempted only
by companies with very efficient management teams (in which
case the average performance will be representative of the best-
practice performance), while other strategies are attempted by
both well-managed and poorly managed banking companies (in
which case the average performance will not be representative of
the best-practice performance). We plan to pursue this issue in fu-
ture research.
7A technical point: Each of the Sharpe ratios displayed in table 2
is calculated by taking the average of the individual Sharpe ratios
for the banking companies in a given strategy group. These num-
bers are analytically different from the Sharpe ratios implied for
each of the strategy groups in figure 6, which plots the averages
of the individual returns (vertical axis) and individual risks (hori-
zontal axis) for the banking companies in each strategy group. In
the figure, the Sharpe ratio is implied by the slope of a line run-
ning from about 0.043 on the vertical axis (the average risk-free
rate during the sample period) through the plotted points. The
two approaches are conceptually similar and result in similar
rankings of the strategy groups in terms of their risk–return
tradeoffs. However, the Sharpe ratio averages displayed in table 2
are superior because they directly link risk and return for each
banking company, which is where the ex ante managerial deci-
sions to trade risk for return are made.
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